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I. PROPERTY AND SPEECH: CONSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITES OR
CONSTITUTIONAL TWINS?
My task in this article is not an enviable one: It is to persuade
you that the dominant mode of thinking about property rights
during the past fifty years has been a mistake of constitutional
dimensions. It would be convenient if I could say that I merely
favor a return to the set of doctrines that governed economic lib-
erty and property before 1937, in the so-called Lochner era.' Yet
that description would understate the difference between my views
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and the historical evolution of the law. Some of the most restric-
tive decisions on property rights took place in the years before
1937, often by judges who would be described as conservative by
modern standards. I refer here by way of example to the lamenta-
ble decisions of Justice Holmes in Block v Hirsh,2 and of Justice
Sutherland in Euclid v Ambler Realty Co.' The first of these up-
held the power of the state to impose rent control restrictions,
"temporarily" of course;4 and the second gave the state expansive
powers to control land use through zoning, 5 a power that has
hardly been enlarged in the ensuing sixty years of ceaseless
litigation.
I am therefore urging not a return to some lost golden era, but
the adoption of a regime for the protection of private property and
economic liberties that is far more extensive and internally coher-
ent than the patchwork of protections afforded to these interests
under the Takings Clause before 1937. More difficult still, I believe
that all this transformation is possible even with the universal ac-
ceptance of the "welfare state"-the commitment to support peo-
ple in need by casting that burden on others through the coercive
mechanism of the state-which has become a permanent part of
the basic constitutional order at both the state and federal level.
My task is made more complicated in that the defense of the pre-
sent constitutional scheme is undertaken by Professor Frank
Michelman, who surely ranks among the most eloquent expositors
of the Just Compensation Clause, and as one of the most ardent
defenders of the modern legal order that I seek to undermine.'
In order to develop my case, I shall pursue the analysis from
an unconventional quarter: I shall look at the doctrinal structures
of First Amendment law and then indicate how they can, and
should, be carried over into the analysis and discussion of the Tak-
ings Clause. My basic conclusion is that the Takings Clause and
economic liberties should not be viewed as things alien and uncon-
genial to modern constitutional norms. One need only apply to pri-
2 256 US 135 (1921). I have criticized Holmes's Block opinion in Richard A. Epstein,
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 176-77 (Harvard, 1985)
("Takings"); and in Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regula-
tion, 54 Brooklyn L Rev 741, 748-50 (1988).
3 272 US 365 (1926). I have also criticized Sutherland's Euclid opinion in Epstein, Tak-
ings at 131-34 (cited in note 2).
' Block, 256 US at 154.
' Euclid, 272 US at 388-90.
0 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165 (1967), an acknowledged
classic in the area.
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vate property the presuppositions and techniques that have organ-
ized the law of freedom of speech. Within this framework the sole
concession that one must make to the welfare state is to accept
income redistribution funded with taxes (perhaps even progressive
taxes) derived from general revenue sources. Otherwise, the edifice
to protect freedom of speech carries over to private property, with-
out losing a beat.
In comparing amendments, there is a genuine question as to
which body of First Amendment law one should consult. The obvi-
ous point of departure is the body of case law developed by the
United States Supreme Court. That is, of course, an incredibly
complicated body of law, with many nuances that are not necessa-
rily relevant to the present discussion. 7 More critically to this en-
terprise, it may well contain certain serious mistakes of both
under- and over-protection of speech that can embarrass any gen-
eral theory.
Some of the free speech decisions are simply wrong in princi-
ple. For example, New York Times Co. v Sullivan" protects speech
more than a comprehensive theory of speech requires.9 In the op-
posite direction, of course, a consistent theory also requires more
extensive protection of speech than the Court now provides.10
Other free speech decisions, though sound in principle, incor-
rectly apply the principle to the case at hand. One conspicuous il-
lustration is perhaps United States v O'Brien," where the Su-
preme Court upheld the conviction of the defendant for burning
his draft card, in violation of a content-neutral statute that for-
bade the willful destruction of draft cards for any purpose.' 2 The
Court announced that it followed a test of compelling state inter-
est, which I regard as sound law.' 3 But the Court then so watered
down its application as to allow the weakest forms of administra-
I For one recent account, see Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 1011-454
(Little Brown, 2d ed 1991).
* 376 US 254 (1964).
* See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U Chi L Rev
782 (1986). See also text accompanying notes 66-70.
10 See text accompanying notes 93-95.
391 US 367 (1968).
Id at 382.
'3 The relevant portion of the opinion reads:
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court
has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating;
paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it
clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmen-
tal interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
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tive convenience-communication with draftees, reminders of civic
obligations-to count as compelling state interests. 14
A similar debasement of the compelling state interest test is
apparent in Austin v Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.1 5
There the Court found a compelling state interest that allowed
Michigan to prohibit corporations from making independent ex-
penditures to support or oppose candidates for state elective office.
The Court's inquiry on the question of state justification was, how-
ever, wholly disingenuous, for the Court contented itself with un-
supported assertions that corporate contributions were "corrosive
and distorting" of the overall level of political debates. 6 But there
was no effort to offer any account of those rough and tumble politi-
cal debates which were uncorrupted and undistorted. Nor was
there the slightest recognition that different corporations might
weigh in on different sides of election campaigns, or that political
expenditures by corporations might be especially valuable precisely
because corporations (and their out-of-state shareholders) could
not vote in elections whose outcome is of major importance to
them. It is difficult to see how any selective restriction on the par-
ties entitled to engage in political speech should survive a First
Amendment challenge.
I regard it, however, as mistaken to allow the covert dilutions
of the compelling state interest test in either O'Brien or Austin to
organize any comparison between First and Fifth Amendment law.
Even after these decisions, it is possible to make sensible internal
adjustments and reevaluations of First Amendment law to facili-
tate the appropriate comparisons.'7 Basically, the "corrections"
that one must make to speech law for the analysis to be good must
satisfy two conditions: First, they cannot be so numerous that they
completely revise First Amendment law, and second, they must ac-
cord with the doctrine's accepted animating principles.
Finally, there is a third limitation with respect to the kinds of
issues that I consider. Generally stated, both the First and Fifth
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
1 Id at 378-90.
' 494 US 652 (1990). For trenchant criticism, see Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster
Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures,
32 Wm & Mary L Rev 587 (1991).
" Austin, 494 US at 660.
17 For an example of such reevaluation of O'Brien, see Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech
and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 S Ct Rev 1, 23-27, 42-46.
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Amendments can apply to two distinct types of situations. In the
first, the government seeks to regulate the private activities of in-
dividuals on their own property. 8 The activity could be a political
meeting, or the construction of a new home. In the second, the gov-
ernment seeks to regulate activities on public property."9 Thus the
issue is how the government can allocate "its" own resources
through contract or through grant. Typically the issue is what con-
ditions the government may attach to its permission to use public
space or to receive public funding. Sometimes the question is
whether the government can condition a tax benefit upon the per-
formance of some particular act or the making of some particular
statement.20 These latter issues are of increasing importance in
modern times, and in many cases where the government acts as a
contracting party, I think that the law is less protective of both
speech and property than it should be." Nonetheless the exclusive
focus in this Article shall be on the role of government as regula-
tor, not as contracting party, funding agent, or property owner.
With these caveats in mind, it is critical to understand the ba-
sic attitude that courts take toward the legislative and executive
branches of government. Whatever the virtues of stirring rhetoric,
it is clear that the First Amendment cannot prohibit all regulation
of speech by all government at all levels. Freedom of speech is not
the same as an uninhibited license to speak-to lie, to deceive, to
molest, to coerce. So the fundamental postulate of distrust of gov-
ernment does not translate into a total ban against all government
regulation of all forms of speech, but into a strong presumption
that can be overridden only by establishing some compelling gov-
ernment interest, as the language used in O'Brien and Austin itself
indicated. The key questions therefore under the First Amend-
ment-and they are also the key questions under the Fifth
, See, for example, Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825 (1987) (Com-
mission granted a permit allowing construction of a larger house on beachfront property on
the condition that the property owners grant the public an easement across their private
beach).
,' See, for example, Lovell v City of Griffin, 303 US 444 (1938) (permit required to
distribute circulars within the city limits); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367
(1969) (FCC requirement that each side of a public issue be presented on broadcast stations;
the "fairness doctrine").
" See, for example, Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513 (1958) (veteran's tax exemption
conditioned on filing of an oath that taxpayer did not advocate overthrow of the United
States or California governments, nor advocate support of a hostile government during
wartime).
"1 For a statement of my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988).
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Amendment-are the following: First, what is the scope of the ini-
tial protection afforded by the presumption in favor of free
speech? Second, how can that protection be overridden?
This inquiry, even within a strict interpretative framework, is
necessarily vast. No analysis of what is meant by speech alone will
determine the contours of freedom of speech. Instead it is neces-
sary to detail the operations of a system of freedom, a vast under-
taking that reluctant judges undertake only because they labor
under the strict compulsion to decide cases. But scholars can and
must be more relentless and systematic in their pursuits. The basic
outlines of a system of freedom of speech must be delineated and
defended. But the size of the payoff is commensurate with the dif-
ficulty of the undertaking. If we understand how this body of law
works, then we will have a good road map for understanding the
Takings Clause.
There are, of course, important differences between the Free
Speech and Takings Clauses. The Free Speech Clause does not
contain a Just Compensation Clause ("Congress may abridge free-
dom of speech for public use, with just compensation"),22 and it is
possible to protect freedom of speech without at all confronting
what is critical about economic affairs in the welfare state: the re-
distribution of wealth on the basis of need. But before distinguish-
ing property from speech, it is important to see what general view
links them together. The modern insistence that speech is a funda-
mental liberty, while property is the creature of legislation and
subject to its whims, does much to distort the proper relationship
between the two sets of constitutional limitations. The Free
Speech and Takings Clauses should be understood as working in
harmony with each other, not in opposition. It is important there-
fore never to forget the essentially libertarian cast to both clauses:
strong, decentralized private rights and a central government with
limited powers, any exercise of which must be justified.
In this Article I shall outline the basic linkage between these
two clauses in order to demonstrate that what has proved sound
policy for speech should pay handsome social dividends for prop-
erty and economic affairs as well. Indeed, there is good reason to
believe that free speech will produce more net social benefit in a
world in which property rights are more carefully protected than
under the present state of affairs, where there is essentially no con-
22 Compare US Const, Amend I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech .... "), with US Const, Amend V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.").
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stitutional protection of property and contract against prospective
legislation, or, it now appears, against retroactive legislation as
well.13 In order to make this case, I shall explicate the dominant
tendencies of First Amendment law through the eyes of a cautious
libertarian, and then show how the parallel issues for property are
usually resolved in a very different fashion.
The plan of action is therefore as follows. In Section II, I argue
that the constitutional defenses of property and speech rest on the
sense that government is a necessary evil. Government is necessary
to preserve civil order, but its officials should not be viewed as sav-
iors; they are self-interested persons with imperfect knowledge
subject to a universal presumption of distrust.
In Section III, I identify the extensive set of issues common to
freedom of speech and to the protection of private property. I show
how the postulate of distrust organizes First Amendment doctrine,
and how its absence explains the flaccid and unprincipled structure
of the law protecting private property and economic liberties. The
points of parallelism are made evident by the logical structure of
the two clauses. Both clauses set initial presumptions, and not final
absolutes. In both areas, therefore, the complete inquiry requires
at least five stages: (1) identifying the protected private interest;
(2) identifying the state actions that violate that interest; (3) justi-
fying those state actions, if possible; (4) timing the remedy to pro-
tect the private interest; and (5) determining whether to force an
exchange to curtail that interest.
Finally, in Section IV, I explain how the logical structure of
the First Amendment can be carried over to deal with economic
liberties, even granting the unassailable first premise of the welfare
state-some form of income and wealth distribution in favor of the
poor.
II. THE LOGIC OF DISTRUST
It is perhaps useful to begin with a point that can be lost in
the more abstract discussion of constitutional theory that follows.
There is, of course, both a Free Speech Clause and a Takings
Clause (one that contains explicit reference to "private property"),
and the extensive interpretive enterprise that follows is an effort to
make sense of the two texts in the wide range of situations to
which they apply. To begin, however, I do not want to concentrate
23 See, for example, Usery v Turner-Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 US 1 (1976) (constitu-
tionality of retroactive taxes to fund black lung disease compensation plans).
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on specific textual difficulties, but on a second aspect of constitu-
tional interpretation of equal dignity with the first: the basic atti-
tudes toward government that are brought to the interpretation of
a particular text. Under the First Amendment that attitude clearly
is, or has to be, an attitude of distrust.24
I do not have in mind any very narrow or technical meaning of
distrust. As a matter of hornbook law, the person who receives a
friend's money, which she then converts to her own use, is a person
who has abused a trust. By like analogy, the person who receives
public money, which she then spends for private purposes, has
abused a trust as well. In each case, a person stands in a position
whereby she can obtain personal gain at the expense of individuals
to whom she owes a duty. In other cases, the idea of distrust has to
do with favoritism: benefits are given to A that are denied to B;
when their roles are reversed, some other "neutral" principle of de-
cision is employed to make sure that A prevails again, for reasons
utterly irrelevant to any public purpose. The postulate of distrust
holds that persons with a public interest to protect and a political
agenda to advance will be willing-across the board-to sacrifice
the former in order to advance the latter.
In putting the concern in this particular fashion, the idea of
distrust is a universal solvent that can be brought to bear on any
political initiative. Distrust has both ancient lineage and modern
application: "Quis custodiet custodies?" ("Who guards the guardi-
ans?") is a Latin maxim that has lost none of its vitality in its
contemporary setting. By the same token, distrust is not tied to
any narrow or partisan political agenda: Democrat or Republican,
liberal or conservative, are equally capable of abusing the public
trust. The themes of self-dealing, of waste, of corruption, which are
obvious corollaries to the concern with distrust, should also reso-
nate across the usual political lines of controversy. The point is not
that all statutes and all government actions are worthy of distrust,
for some genuine public interest statutes (think of the Statute of
24 See, for example, Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 Am Bar Found Res J 521. In particular, Blasi notes:
One basic value seems highly relevant to these newer claims [for First Amendment
protection], yet has not been accorded a central place in our articulated theory of the
First Amendment. This is the value that free speech, a free press, and free assembly
can serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials.
Id at 527. I will address some of the other values later. It is sufficient to note here that the
list of four values announced by Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression
6-7 (Random House, 1970), does not contain the checking value. See text accompanying
note 31.
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Frauds and the standard statute of limitation) can emerge from
the political process. Yet, at the very least, distrust alerts us to the
constant temptation facing any public official who is entrusted
with extensive power, but who is all too often subject to only lim-
ited supervision.
This theme of distrust, suitably qualified, is not only central to
political theory; it is also central to any reading of our constitu-
tional heritage. When Madison wrote that "Enlightened statesmen
will not always be at the helm,"25 it was clear that he thought that
diversion of public wealth and position for private gain was the
central problem that government must face. The force of his re-
mark is only confirmed by looking at the motley collection of pub-
lic officials holding high office today. Similarly, Madison's discus-
sion of the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and
the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that
the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of
our constitutional structure.
The protection of speech (which is limited to protection
against actions by Congress), and the protection of property
(which, if anything, is more comprehensive 26) should be read in
light of these political concerns. All too often the desire of political
figures to suppress speech has to be understood as a crude effort to
suppress criticism of public actors, which could lead to their de-
served political embarrassment, removal from office, or electoral
defeat. Thus the social good of free speech is found in the funda-
mental check it exerts on how government officials behave. 7 Harry
Kalven, while no public choice theorist, was right to stress the im-
portance of seditious libel as the central lesson of the First Amend-
ment-the need to fear government misconduct.28 A complex set of
25 See Federalist 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77, 80
(Mentor, 1961) ("It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened states-
men will not always be at the helm.").
28 Compare US Const, Amend I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech ...."), with US Const, Amend V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use with just compensation."). The passive voice of the Fifth Amendment does not
expressly limit the Fifth Amendment protection to laws passed by Congress.
2 See Blasi, 1977 Am Bar Found Res J at 529-38 (cited in note 24), for the antecedents
in Locke and Madison.
28 See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Mean-
ing of the First Amendment", 1964 S Ct Rev 191, 205 ("[A]nalysis of free-speech issues
should hereafter begin with the significant issue of seditious libel and defamation of govern-
ment by its critics rather than with the sterile example of a man falsely yelling fire in a
crowded theatre."). Kalven may have been correct about the example, but he was wrong
about the tradition. Holmes used the example of crying fire in order to show why the free-
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doctrines for both content regulation and content-neutral regula-
tion has grown up out of this fear of government misconduct.29
This fear, while strongest for political speech,3° surely extends to
manifold other forms of artistic and literary expression as well.
A. Distrust: A Single Rationale for Speech and Takings Law
This effort to locate a single concern behind the First Amend-
ment is at variance with the common intellectual practice, which
insists that there are many separate "value bases" that lie behind
the interpretation of any given constitutional provision. The domi-
nant modes of modern interpretation are far too ecumenical: They
try to find a broad collection of values to justify the key constitu-
tional provisions, and then pick that rule which best accommo-
dates those competing values. Thus Professor Emerson's list for
free speech, which has achieved the status of conventional wisdom,
includes individual self-fulfillment, the pursuit of truth in the mar-
ketplace of ideas, participation in public life, and the maintenance
of a stable community through interaction and exchange."
I am instinctively and deeply suspicious of explanations that
rely on a combination of many independent factors to generate the
doctrinal structure of any area of law. The objection is formal. Two
values can either cut in the same direction or in different direc-
tions. If they cut in the same direction, then it is not possible to
choose between them. If they cut in different directions, then any
outcome can be achieved by assigning the right weight to the pre-
ferred value. The uneasiness that many commentators have had
with "balancing tests" under the First Amendment is not only be-
cause of the practical indeterminacy of such tests, but also because
of their theoretical malleability: When no single variable is to be
maximized, then any solution is as good as any other. We should
have the same suspicion of these loose tests under the Takings
dom of speech was not an absolute. See Schenck v United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919). But
the early cases testing the limitations on speech were all concerned with seditious activities
and national security. Schenck itself involved pamphlets urging resistance to the draft. See
id at 50-51.
11 For exhaustive and sympathetic expositions of the basic positions, see Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 189 (1983);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46 (1987).
30 Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U Chi L Rev 255, 262-63, 301
(1992) (First Amendment principally protects political speech).
3' Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression at 6-8 (cited in note 24).
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Clause, where the plastic nature of the doctrine is evident upon the
slightest inspection.2
It is important therefore to recognize that there is weakness
and not strength in the common effort to find plural bases for
speech and takings law.3 3 In order to show that such strategies are
not appropriate, I make just two assumptions: first, that legislators
and executives always have perfect knowledge, and second, that
they always seek to serve the public good. On these assumptions, I
argue, even if the First and Fifth Amendments were given the
most stringent interpretations imaginable, every statute would be
constitutional under the most stringent standards of judicial
review.34
1. Distrust and the Takings Clause.
To demonstrate, let us begin with the Takings Clause. What
kinds of economic legislation should we expect the legislature to
pass if it had perfect knowledge and perfect motivation? In the
first place, we should expect that each and every statute would ex-
pand the total size of the economic pie. There would be no reason
for the legislature to adopt any rule that would cost the losers
more than it would provide to the winners. The allocative losses
involved are losses that are imposed on someone, and a legislature
with perfect knowledge would know that these losses exist, and one
with perfect motivation would never wish to inflict them gratui-
tously. Instead the legislature would adopt only those proposals
that produced a net benefit for the citizenry at large. Markets
would be allowed to operate where they functioned well; where
they did not, they would only be restrained by the best possible
system of legislation.
Thus the first consequence of this system is that each public
transaction would produce a net social gain; that is, the legislature
would achieve Kaldor-Hicks optimality.3 5 The Takings Clause,
however, is concerned not only with the size of the gain, but also
32 1 pursue this theme in Richard A. Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Emi-
nent Domain Clause, 1982 S Ct Rev 351.
33 For the opposite conclusion, as applied to takings, see Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory
of Property ch 11 (Cambridge, 1990).
34 I have developed this argument with respect to the Takings Clause in Richard A.
Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 Harv J L & Pub Pol 713, 745-47
(1989).
"' Under the Kaldor-Hicks standard of optimality, a transaction is judged to be effi-
cient only if it produces a net gain, whether or not it improves the economic position of each
individual party to the transaction.
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with its distribution. It is designed tb ensure that any allocative
improvements introduced by the legislature do not suffer from at-
tendant distributive dislocations. In other words, the Just Com-
pensation Clause contemplates the Pareto standard of optimality,36
not the Kaldor-Hicks standard. 3
But if the legislature is knowledgeable and benevolent, it will
also make the right allocative decision in every case; it will achieve
Pareto optimality as well. Even if there are losers under one stat-
ute, it is likely that they will be the winners in the next, for the
benevolent legislature will not favor one class of citizens over an-
other. As the number of contexts in which legislation is passed in-
creases, the odds that any person will be a net loser over the full
set of transactions is reduced asymptotically to zero.-8 Given that
the winners and losers in each case are randomly selected from the
whole, it follows that there is no need for the winners to compen-
sate the losers in any individual transaction. It also follows that
the legislature will not even have to pay the administrative costs of
calculating losses and gains in each case: It knows it will achieve
Pareto optimality over time and across statutes, and so it can dis-
pense with the entire process of valuation and side payments.
The motivation for the Takings Clause must come from a fear
that the legislature has imperfect knowledge, imperfect motives, or
both. The power to coerce is enormous, and there is the risk that it
will be used to benefit those who possess it at the cost of those who
suffer from it. One reason to dislike theft is that it has the ten-
dency to move goods from high to low value uses with positive ad-
ministrative costs. The same dangers inhere in legislation under a
system of majority rule. The Just Compensation Clause requires
payment for the taking as a means of disciplining the legislature. If
the legislature can afford to pay when it takes, then the fact of
compensation itself gives some reason to believe in the net social
gain. The clause therefore is designed to prevent allocative losses
through collective action, and that problem only arises if the legis-
lature has imperfect knowledge or imperfect motivations. Without
legislative abuse, there would be no need to insist upon
compensation.
3 Under the Pareto standard of optimality, a transaction is judged to be efficient if it
improves, or at least does not worsen, the economic position of each individual party to the
transaction.
37 Thus a transaction which achieves Kaldor-Hicks optimality, but which worsens the
economic position of one or more parties to the transaction, can only achieve Pareto op-
timality if the winners then compensate the losers.
38 See Epstein, 12 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 746 & n 60 (cited in note 34).
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On the other side of the coin, the Just Compensation Clause
also eliminates the need for the judiciary to compare what the
public gains from the statute with what the individual property
owner loses. The danger of legislative abuse invites judicial over-
sight of the legislature. A compensation test thus becomes neces-
sary in order to reduce the otherwise horrendous pressures on the
judicial system to sort out which government interventions are jus-
tified and which are not. But the courts have access to little infor-
mation about what kinds of transactions benefit the public, and,
by definition, cannot trust any information on that score provided
by the state. On the other hand, the courts can get tolerable mea-
sures of individual losses in a wide range of cases, or can find some
structural reason in the even distribution of benefits and burdens39
to obviate the need for direct measurement of public benefit in
each case. The constitutional articulation of a just compensation
standard is not equivalent to a "taking with good cause" standard.
It is invoked not only to secure justice to the individual, but also to
combat the untrustworthiness of government officials.
2. Distrust and the Free Speech Clause.
The analysis of distrust under the First Amendment is similar.
It is often said that the First Amendment is designed to serve
other values: to encourage participation in good government; to en-
sure that a diversity of viewpoints are expressed; to enable per-
sonal self-realization." The control of legislative abuse is thought
to be only one value among many, and a late entry into the pan-
theon at that.
But again suppose that there were no fear of abuse, so that the
legislature passed speech laws with perfect knowledge and benevo-
lent motives. Why then the concern? The ideal legislature would
be as concerned with individual self-realization as any court, and it
would better know how to achieve it. If collective support for
speech were necessary, the legislature would provide the proper
subsidies to the proper persons in the proper amounts. It would
promote the necessary diversity of opinions and provide the infor-
mation necessary to facilitate good individual choices. But, if re-
strictions on speech were necessary to facilitate the right choices,
the legislature would also provide them. Quite simply, the good
11 See the discussion of disproportionate impact tests in Epstein, Takings at 204-09
(cited in note 2).
40 See text accompanying note 31.
1992]
The University of Chicago Law Review
and knowledgeable legislature wants what the learned scholars of
constitutional law want. If we had no cause to distrust the legisla-
ture, then we could dispense with the costly and inconvenient ap-
paratus of judicial review of the First Amendment, and could rely
upon Meiklejohn's good citizens to reach the right result every
time.41 His version of the "good man" calls for a celebration of free
speech, but gives no reason why speech needs or should receive
constitutional protection.
Yet we do not take Meiklejohn's carefree attitude, and abuse
of public office is the only reason for political aspiration to be
transferred into constitutional protection. From virtuous legisla-
tors there is little to fear, and it is doubtful that the First Amend-
ment will constrain them in any meaningful way. But bad legisla-
tors in power have a tendency to stay in power. Just as they will
steal, there is a risk that they will stifle criticism, rig debate, and
disseminate falsehoods to achieve their ends. It is to them, or to
their control, that the First Amendment is dedicated.
But why trust the judges, who are subject to imperfections of
their own? The answer is that there is no system of perfect control,
and judicial review is simply part of the better overall strategy to
curb abuse. The reason is that judicial review is another mecha-
nism that provides for a division of power. With judicial review in
place, any piece of legislation has to clear an additional hur-
dle-which is good, because the presumption of distrust translates
into the belief that more rather than less legislation is the greater
danger. But there should be no illusion: If all branches of govern-
4' See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the
People (Harper, 1960) (originally published in 1948). As Vincent Blasi has noted,
Meiklejohn's participation theory treats government as a large town meeting, composed of
virtuous citizens who participate for the common good. Blasi, 1977 Am Bar Found Res J at
554-67 (cited in note 24). Meiklejohn's virtuous citizen is the antithesis of the "bad man" of
whom Holmes wrote in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev
457 (1897). Of Holmes, Meiklejohn said:
As against the dogma of Mr. Holmes I would venture to assert the counterdogma that
one cannot understand the basic purposes of our Constitution as a judge or a citizen
should understand them, unless one sees them as a good man, a man who, in his politi-
cal activities, is not merely fighting for what, under the law, he can get, but is eagerly
and generously serving the common welfare.
Blasi, 1977 Am Bar Found Res J at 557 (cited in note 24) (quoting Meiklejohn, Political
Freedom at 66).
The asserted separation between the private and public self adumbrates many of the
themes prominent in the republican revival of the 1980s. See, for example, Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv L Rev 4 (1986); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539 (1988). For criticism, see also Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight From Substance, 97 Yale L J 1633
(1988).
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ment have unsound beliefs or corrupt motives, then the additional
division of power brought on by judicial review still will not alter
any flawed outcomes achieved by the legislative process alone. The
protection of private property and economic liberties fails today
solely because no branch in our government-legislative or judi-
cial-accords them the same weight that they had in the original
constitutional scheme.
B. Mutual Reinforcement of Property and Speech Rights
In light of distrust, we should be very leery indeed of any pro-
posals, such as those advanced recently by Owen Fiss,42 that wish
to reduce the protection of freedom of speech to the paltry level
now afforded economic liberties. Fiss is correct to see that the ba-
sic assumptions about the behavior of government and private offi-
cials are as important to the interpretation of the First Amend-
ment as they are to the Fifth. But he sadly underestimates the
capacity for legislative abuse that lies in both these areas. The
endless machinations of the Federal Communications Commission,
a body which regulates both speech and property rights in the
spectrum of broadcast frequencies, offer, it seems fair to say, no
reason to believe that a system of extensive government regulation
would improve the level of political discourse in this country.4 A
simpler strategy that would charge the government with the en-
forcement of property rights, by actions against interference, is far
superior to endless administrative wrangles to decide which groups
should receive public subsidies for what activities.
The government necessarily holds a monopoly over force.
While large private organizations may develop, their net worth is
not a measure of their political power, so long as they can acquire
property and influence only by consent and not by coercion. In an-
titrust law, the size of a firm is not evidence of its market power,
and the same conclusion holds for constitutional theory. Let there
be many large and powerful voices: They will not speak in unison;
and in any event, they will have to pay for what they wish to say.
" See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L Rev 1405 (1986);
Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 Harv L Rev 781 (1987).
"' The most influential criticism of the FCC is still R.H. Coase, The Federal Communi-
cation Commission, 2 J L & Econ 1 (1959). Coase's work could not have anticipated the
developments of the past thirty years, during which the level of government performance
has been every bit as dismal. See also Jonathan W. Emord, Freedom, Technology, and the
First Amendment (Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1991); Thomas W. Hazlett,
The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J L & Econ 133, 133-34
(1990).
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So long as there are secure property rights in the press (which
there currently are not in broadcasting), then entry will be at low
cost and many possible voices will be heard, checking influence
with influence and power with power. The great mistake of social-
ism is to equate the risks of a rich market actor with those of the
sole 'government actor. We should not repeat that mistake as a
matter of modern constitutional theory.
1. Limiting factionalism through property rights.
All this is not to say that there is no danger today to our First
Amendment rights. There is, but it comes from a source not usu-
ally cited. The current laws make it impossible to have well-de-
fined property rights in anything. While possession of property
may be secure against government removal, the use and disposition
of virtually any asset is fair game for obstruction by the political
process, whether through taxation or regulation. That political
power sparks private lobbyists to petition government not only for
the redress of grievances but also for partisan advantage, and legis-
lators can demand their pound of flesh in return.44
Within this environment, more speech is not better. Freedom
of speech allows factions to organize and mobilize in order to ob-
tain wealth transfers through taxation or regulation; thus freedom
of speech only reduces overall social wealth and security. The
fierce battles fought by single issue political action groups of all
stripes and persuasions are strong evidence of an overheated and
wasteful political system in decline. It is partly for this reason that
there is such a prevalent desire to control campaign expenditures,
a practice which nevertheless has proved fitful and counter-
productive.46
Yet here the right solution is not to restrict the liberty to
speak or to lobby, given the additional risk of government abuse
that would be created. It is rather to reduce the power of govern-
ment to transfer wealth and dispense favors. Once the government
cannot do the bidding of the interest groups who crowd its corri-
dors, these groups will devote their efforts to more socially produc-
tive activities. The compression of the set of permissible govern-
ment tasks will indirectly, but effectively, improve the level of
" For a brief but forceful statement, see Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and
Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J Legal Stud 101 (1987). The
contrast between McChesney and Meiklejohn is manifest.
" See, for example, Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). I develop this theme further in
Epstein, 97 Yale L J at 1643-45 (cited in note 41).
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public discourse both by changing the items on the public agenda
and by redirecting the resources that are used to obtain them. In
short, when viewed in isolation, expansive protection of freedom of
speech is neither a good nor a bad. It becomes an unambiguous
good only when paired up with a system of limited government
and strong property rights.
2. Eliminating "incidental" burdens on speech through prop-
erty rights.
The structure of property rights influences the patterns of
speech and discourse in yet another fashion. It is accepted horn-
book law that the First Amendment does not cover regulations of
private property that have only an incidental effect upon speech,
no matter how large that incidental effect.46 Of course, it is under-
standable that the Supreme Court would adopt a rule of this sort,
since it has already decided to scrap any extensive constitutional
protection for property rights. It has to police the undeniable fric-
tion that takes place at the property/speech frontier. Otherwise,
the Court is in danger of indirectly undoing all forms of property
regulation in the name of free speech.
This danger is sufficiently great that indirect burdens may be
placed on speech so long as the restriction passes nondiscrimina-
tion and intent tests. The nondiscrimination test requires that the
restriction be imposed upon activities both unrelated and related
to speech. The intent test requires that the government not dis-
guise its real purpose to attack speech through the regulation in
question.
The net effect of this regime is to countenance a very large
reduction in the amount and quality of speech that reaches the
public. I have two favorite recent examples of this problem. The
first is that of the New York newspapers. Under the above two-
pronged test, the government can require newspapers (whose edi-
torial content cannot otherwise be regulated) to negotiate with un-
ions under the National Labor Relations Act. As a result, the New
York Times has been locked in extensive negotiations with its un-
ions over work crews and job assignments for its modern New
Jersey plant, which is capable of printing colored pictures.4 7 Simi-
larly, the New York Daily News has been caught in bitter union
" See Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U
Chi L Rev 91, 112 (1992).
17 See New York Times Reaches Agreement with Union, Reuters Bus Rep (Dec 12,
1991).
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strikes, which have resulted in violence, disrupted its service, and
eventually forced the sale of the Daily News in order to escape
labor negotiations.4" The second example, which involves both reli-
gion and speech, is that of St. Bartholomew's Church in New York.
Under the two-pronged test, the government can subject private
organizations such as churches to zoning laws which restrict their
ability to sell their property. As a result, St. Bartholomew's has
been driven toward bankruptcy because it cannot sell or develop
its valuable real estate, which has been declared a landmark by the
city of New York.49 In all of these cases, the courts have refused to
single out the press (or religion) for special treatment, determining
that the consequences of the regulations, while large, were none-
theless "incidental."5
But of course in real life the consequences are more than "in-
cidental." And a stronger system of property protection would
have obviated these consequences. All firms would be free to de-
cide the workers to whom they wish to offer jobs, and all landown-
ers would be able to develop their property, subject to the ordinary
constraints of nuisance law, without having first to obtain state ap-
proval. A greater level of constitutional protection for property
rights would prevent the doctrine of incidental effects from stifling
constitutional protection of free speech. Indeed, a unified concep-
tion of speech and property would leave no place at all for the doc-
trine of incidental effects under the First Amendment, which is all
to the good. That doctrine is but a concession to the reality that
there are great losses that must go unredressed-it counts as a
point in favor of a unified theory that it can dispense with so un-
satisfactory a conception.
A system which protects private property rights, driven by a
universal conception of distrust, thus improves speech in two di-
rections. First, it undermines the incentives for unproductive fac-
tional speech by eliminating the gains from factional politics. Sec-
ond, it reduces the cost of the speech that is left, by protecting
speech against the incidental burdens of property regulation. And
it does both without increasing the dangers of central government
control.
See David E. Pitt, News Having Trouble Getting Paper Out, NY Times B4 (Oct 29,
1990).
'9 See St. Bartholomew's Church v City of New York, 914 F2d 348 (2d Cir 1990) (up-
holding New York City's landmark law against Free Exercise Clause and Takings Clause
challenges).
50 Id at 355.
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Constitutional law has gone badly astray in creating the mas-
sive divide between speech and property. In order to show just how
badly off course it has gone, it is useful to examine the doctrinal
underpinnings in both speech and takings law. In that light, my
views in Takings5 will not seem fanciful, idealistic, utopian or
anachronistic, for they represent a point-by-point extension to the
Takings Clause of much of First Amendment law. The successes of
the First Amendment can, and should, point the way to the revi-
talization of takings law.
III. PROPERTY AND SPEECH: DOCTRINAL PARALLELS
Presently, the great divide between property and speech rests
on differing conceptions of distrust in each doctrinal area. The pos-
tulate of distrust drives the law of freedom of speech and, with
some exceptions, has led the Court to create a coherent and power-
ful intellectual structure. The opposite presumption of legislative
knowledge and probity has led to a continuous judicial horror show
with respect to economic liberties and private property, in which
judges strain to avoid the literal meaning of constitutional provi-
sions in order to obtain indefensible doctrinal results.
Nonetheless, the possibility of parallel construction of the
Free Speech and Takings Clauses should be evident in the parallel-
ism of the questions that arise under both of the clauses: First,
what is the scope of the substantive interest to be protected? Sec-
ond, what government acts violate that interest? Third, what
might justify the state in violating that interest? Fourth, what is
the remedy for the violation of that interest? Fifth, and perhaps
surprisingly for the First Amendment, when does the just compen-
sation principle allow the state to force an exchange?
These five questions are precisely parallel to those that arise
in any private law discourse: What is the protected interest? What
is the defendant's wrong? What justification can the defendant of-
fer for the prima facie violation of the interest? What is the rem-
edy for the private wrong? When does the libertarian principle
yield to forced exchanges?5 ' Essentially every substantive question
in public law can be organized around these five issues. But the
range of response may be so different, and parallel interests
Epstein, Takings (cited in note 2).
One example of a forced exchange is the case of private necessity. See Vincent v
Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn 456, 124 NW 221 (1910). The parallels between
conditional privilege and the Just Compensation Clause were developed in Dale W. Broeder,
Torts and Just Compensation: Some Personal Reflections, 17 Hastings L J 217 (1965).
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(speech or property) subject to such divergent legal rules, that it
becomes all too easy to forget that the logical structure of the in-
quiries in both areas is the same.
A. Question One: The Scope of Speech and Property Rights
The first salient point in comparing speech to property rights
is how much broader the coverage is that is given to freedom of
speech. Coverage of speech is broader in at least two separate
ways. First, it is clear that First Amendment jurisprudence cor-
rectly sweeps into its fold all forms of activities whose central mis-
sion is to communicate not only ideas and information, but also
attitudes, sentiments and feelings. It goes without saying that the
First Amendment covers political speech, but it covers artistic and
literary expression as well. Similarly, without real tussle, the mod-
ern media-for example, fax machines, broadcasts, and electronic
mail-are as strongly protected by the First Amendment as the
traditional printing press. Finally, even such activities as flag burn-
ing53 and nude dancing54 fall within the purview of the First
Amendment. There are some qualifications to the doctrine: Under
current theory commercial speech tends to receive lower levels of
protection than political speech, although for reasons that should
be regarded as insufficient once the connections between speech
and property are suitably identified.5 And certain other forms of
speech, such as fighting words and obscenity, are subject to govern-
ment regulation. But rarely does the Court pretend that expressive
activities are outside the sphere of First Amendment consideration
altogether.
Second, constitutional scholars have strained to fit as much
expressive activity as possible under the First Amendment.
Thomas Emerson's influential theoretical treatment, The System
of Freedom of Expression, quite consciously substitutes in the
broader term "expression" for the narrower term "speech."5 While
the expansion of coverage makes good sense, I believe that Emer-
son's basic structure is wrong in one critical respect: The linguistic
move from speech to expression does not remove the need to ex-
5' See Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397 (1989).
5 See Barnes v Glen Theatre, 111 S Ct 2456 (1991). See also text accompanying note
116.
" See, for example, Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942).
56 Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (cited in note 24). Many have
picked up the phrase "freedom of expression." See, for example, Stone, et al, Constitutional
Law at 1011 (cited in note 7).
[59:41
The Politics of Distrust
plain why certain forms of communication are entitled to absolute
immunity from state control. The public justification for restrict-
ing speech has to be fought out in terms of the validity of claims
made by the state, and not on the strength of a classificatory
scheme that looks only to one side of the equation.
The third question about a constitutional right-the state jus-
tification for intruding upon the protected interest-cannot be col-
lapsed, without serious loss of intellectual clarity, into the first
question-the scope of that right. Yet that is precisely the wrong
move that Emerson makes at the outset of his study when he tries
to force the complex system of rules regulating communication
into the single distinction between "action" and "expression," in
which the former is subject to "vastly" more regulation than the
latter.57 Nevertheless, the broad coverage which Emerson affords
speech is surely welcome, for the wide net breathes life into the
central proposition of limited government-that all government
activities should be evaluated under a presumption of distrust.
The same broad coverage is not given to private property
under the Fifth Amendment, but should be. "Private property,"
like "freedom of speech," is a term of comprehensive import, which
surely must be understood to cover more than the rights in land
that were well established under the common law of estates. Just
as the First Amendment protects (or should protect) the freedom
of speech over the airwaves, so too should the Fifth Amendment
protect any property rights that individuals acquire in the air
rights, ideally through a system of first possession." Similarly, the
57 Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression at 8 (cited in note 24). After noting
the line-drawing difficulties, Emerson concluded:
But the crucial point is that the focus of inquiry must be directed toward ascertaining
what is expression, and therefore to be given the protection of expression, and what is
action, and thus subject to regulation as such.
Id at 18. Earlier he had noted that,
in order to achieve its desired goals, a society or the state is entitled to exercise control
over action-whether by prohibiting or compelling it-on an entirely different and
vastly more extensive basis.
Id at 8. Emerson, very much a product of the New Deal, did not perceive any serious tension
between his authoritarian politics and his libertarian views on speech-an inveterate dis-
tinction that I hope to undermine, if not overturn, here.
" Today the government owns the airwaves, which many think allows the government
to control how the spectrum is used or allocated. See National Broadcasting Co. v United
States, 319 US 190 (1943); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367 (1969). Histori-
cally, however, the government did not own the airwaves until after it displaced the spec-
trum rights originally appropriated through first possession. See Coase, 2 J L & Econ at 1-7
(cited in note 43); Emord, Freedom, Technology, and the First Amendment at 138-65 (cited
in note 43). For a criticism of the Court's decision in Red Lion and CBS v Democratic
National Committee, 412 US 94'(1973), see Blasi, 1977 Am Bar Found Res J at 611-31
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Takings Clause should protect those forms of property which in
some sense are dependent not only upon natural acquisition by in-
dividuals, but also upon government recognition, most notably in-
tellectual property-copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets
and the like. Likewise, the Takings Clause should protect special
forms of property in traditional assets, like time-sharing plans, just
as much as it protects traditional forms of property.
Moreover, the definition of property under the Takings Clause
is unjustifiably narrower than under analogous private law doc-
trine. For example, the Takings Clause does not generally protect
"good will." But tort law protects goodwill against destruction, and
contract law permits private parties to transfer goodwill by legally
enforceable agreement. 9 The unwillingness of the courts to recog-
nize goodwill as an independent item of property, or at least as an
element of already recognized business property, represents a true
constitutional injustice.6 0
The rationale for this untoward result is conceptual and un-
satisfying. It is said that the government only takes ongoing busi-
ness property that it uses, and not that which it destroys. But re-
call Blackstone's general injunction that the purpose of
compensation vhen government operates under its power of emi-
nent domain is to ensure that the private holder is not left worse
off by the coercive exercise of government power than he was
before.6 ' That objective can only be accomplished if the govern-
ment must compensate for property destroyed. It surely ought not
(cited in note 24). Blasi stresses the power that a free press can have in checking govern-
mental power. Id at 621. This suggests that easy access to the airwaves (no broadcast rights)
will sometimes advance the checking value. Id at 625. Note too that Emerson calls for exten-
sive social control over licensees, to the ostensible benefit of the public. See Emerson, The
System of Freedom of Expression at 660-67 (cited in note 24). But his discussion makes no
reference to Coase, and utterly ignores the difference between allocating frequencies, by pro-
tecting broadcasts against physical interference, and ordinary content regulation, which
should excite serious First Amendment attention.
11 See, for example, Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles v Abrams, 126
Cal Rptr 473, 543 P2d 905 (1975). For criticism of the modern view, see Gideon Kanner,
When is "Property" not "Property Itself": A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial
of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 Cal W L Rev 57 (1969).
10 See, for example, the notorious "Poletown" case, Poletown Neighborhood Council v
City of Detroit, 410 Mich 616, 304 NW 455 (1981). There the court's failure to take into
account loss of neighborhood goodwill led the court to sustain a takeover of a neighborhood
by General Motors that ignored huge elements of losses to the private owners who were
dispossessed.
11 Of the eminent domain power, such as to acquire land for a road, Blackstone asked
rhetorically:
In this, and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, inter-
pose and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel?
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make a legal difference if the government destroys a house before
it condemns a piece of land instead of condemning the land before
destroying the house. The goodwill associated with real property,
or even with an ongoing business, should be brought within the
scope of the Takings Clause. Unfortunately, courts today, too eager
to protect the budgets of municipal governments, allow them to
wreak destruction of valuable private assets for which any private
malefactor would have to pay.2
B. Question Two: The Violation of the Right
The second part of the problem concerns not the constitu-
tional rights that are protected, but the types of government ac-
tions that they are protected from. Although there are countless
different schemes of government action, they can best be under-
stood as variations on a few pure types of government action. The
most obvious is dispossession-the direct takeover and operation
of private activities; others are modifications of liability rules, reg-
ulation, and taxation. The following sections compare how the
courts have treated each of these four types of government actions
when they affect property, and when they affect speech.
1. Dispossession.
Within the area of property, there is a sharp disjunction be-
tween how the courts treat government dispossession and all other
forms of government action. Those cases where the government
takes "permanent physical possession ' 63 of property are regarded
as per se takings, and the government is required to compensate
the property-owner for the taking. But with only small qualifica-
tions related to when the government compromises the property-
Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by
giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.
William M. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *135 (emphasis added).
62 1 have skirted here the question of whether the government should have to pay for
the destruction of goodwill when it does not take property. In my view the answer is yes. If
a store serves a neighborhood, and the government tears up the neighborhood so that the
store remains, but without customers to frequent it, the store has lost goodwill, here because
the government has forcibly interfered with an advantageous business relationship. The
state should be required to include this loss of goodwill in working its own calculus of con-
demnation. To ignore it would allow the government to externalize systematic harms, which
in turn would allow the government to condemn too much private land.
63 Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 426 (1982).
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owner's "right to exclude, '64 these constitute'the only class of per
se takings, for which compensation is required.
Within the area of speech, stronger protections apply. The
government cannot take permanent physical possession of the New
York Times printing presses, even if the government is prepared to
pay compensation. The protection afforded speech against dispos-
session thus goes beyond that afforded property, but for reasons
that are consistent with the basic logic of the Takings Clause. The
reason why some takings of private property are allowed, with just
compensation, is that the forcible rearrangement of property rights
is understood to provide some net social benefit. But where is the
net benefit when speech is suppressed? The interest in speech is
typically relational-communication is of benefit to the audience
as well as to the speaker-and no compensation formula easily
takes that interest into account. If the government needs a print-
ing press, it knows where to buy it; so too with raw land. On the
other hand, there is the real risk that the government will con-
demn newspapers simply to suppress criticism. In short, prohibit-
ing this limited class of prospective condemnations prevents hardly
any socially beneficial transactions, while permitting them raises
the persistent specter of government abuse. Thus the government
takeover is flatly forbidden under the First Amendment.
2. Modification of liability rules.
The Court has held on a number of occasions, even before
1937,5 that no person has any vested right in any common law rule
of liability. But there has been a long line of Supreme Court cases
in which the very forms of liability rules that provoke only yawns
under the Takings Clause have received close attention under the
Free Speech Clause. For instance, under the First Amendment, the
rules of tort liability are regarded as essential subjects for mischief
and abuse, and hence are given close constitutional scrutiny. The
results can lead to the fortification of some common law rules of
6' Loretto relied heavily on Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 US 164, 179-80 (1979),
in which the Supreme Court found a taking where the government had demanded public
access to a private marina. The case was not one of dispossession, for the state did not seek
to.exclude the private owner from the use of the marina. But the state did compromise the
right to exclude, which the Court found a fundamental stick in the bundle of property
rights. To a property lawyer, the case is too easy to require extended comment. There is a
taking whenever A requires B, a sole owner, to become a joint tenant with A against B's will.
Otherwise A could force the joint tenancy, then partition, and through two steps take half of
what B owns. Do it enough times and we have a new cottage industry of dubious worth.
5 See, for example, New York Central R.R. Co. v White, 243 US 188, 198-200 (1917).
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liability, but to the repudiation of others. Thus, in New York
Times v Sullivan,66 the Court refused to show any deference to the
settled common law of defamation; instead, all of its substantive
dimensions were subject to constitutional review, and in some in-
stances revision. Thus the state cannot expand the definition of
the identification requirement ("of and concerning the plaintiff")
beyond the scope that it had at common law. More dramatically,
the courts have found that certain critical features of common law
protections for defendants have been inadequate. The strict scru-
tiny of liability rules, moreover, is not only directed at issues that
are tangential to the overall soundness of the system, but is di-
rected to issues that go to its heart: awarding general damages;1
putting the burden of proof on the defendant to show truth;68 and,
most importantly, extending the privilege of "fair comment" to
cover not only statements of opinion, but also false statements of
fact, unless the media defendant knows them to be false or acts in
reckless disregard of their truth or falsity."
All these innovations should not be viewed in the same light.
In some instances the Supreme Court reads the First Amendment
in a sound fashion-to maintain requirements of proof that are de-
manded by a consistent theory of individual freedom. Placing the
burden of proof on a plaintiff to prove that certain facts are false is
one such innovation. But, in other instances, as with giving exten-
sive protection to false statements of fact, the Supreme Court goes
far beyond that modest office, and quickly gets itself into trouble.
The major criticism of the modern law of defamation is that it af-
fords no effective redress for public officials and public figures who
have been victimized by false statements. Media defendants are al-
lowed to shield themselves from the harmful consequences of their
acts, merely by admitting that they were negligent.70 Finally, in
some cases, like the doctrine of presumed damages, the balance of
equities is sufficiently close that one wonders why the court finds it
66 376 US 254 (1964).
67 See, for example, Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 348-50 (1974) (no recovery
for presumed or punitive damages).
" Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v Hepps, 475 US 767, 776-78 (1986) (private-figure
plaintiff in defamation action bears burden of showing that alleged defamatory speech is
false).
69 New York Times, 376 US at 279-80. For my defense of the common law baseline in
this connection, see Epstein, 53 U Chi L Rev 782 (cited in note 9).
70 See, for example, Randall P. Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg, and John Soloski, Libel
Law and the Press: Myth and Reality 214-18 (Free Press, 1987) (criticizing focus of defama-
tion law on defendant's mental state and advocating separate procedures that allow adjudi-
cation of question of truth even where plaintiff cannot establish actual malice).
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imperative to upset a balance of interests that seems to have
worked well over time, absent an evidence of systematic abuse or
untoward social consequences.
There are many errors of detail in First Amendment defama-
tion law, virtually all of which stem from its deviation from supe-
rior common law principles. But the mistakes in application do not
deny the bedrock proposition of New York Times: there should be
constitutional scrutiny of the law of libel. That scrutiny of liability
rules should carry over to the Fifth Amendment. As a matter of
general theory, there are not two watertight compartments: one for
property rights, protected by the Constitution; the other for liabil-
ity rules, subject to legislative discretion and control.
To test the proposition by the extreme case, it seems clear
that the total repeal of the law of trespass would constitute a com-
plete revolution in the basic civil order. If individuals are not al-
lowed to exclude deliberate trespassers from their ranks, then we
have retreated from a system of ordered government to a system of
state-sanctioned anarchy. The right to exclude under the rubric of
private property has been protected in some cases. 1 But in many
others, such as when factory owners seek to exclude union or-
ganizers from their land, the Supreme Court has looked upon the
suspension of the common law rules of trespass not with doubt and
suspicion, but with relief and welcome. 2 Similarly, in the entire
area of environmental regulations, it is clear that any appeal to
ideas of trespass, or nuisance, or the right to exclude carries little
weight in the present constitutional order.7
To hold, as I argue, that legislative modifications of liability
rules fall under the Takings Clause would not preclude the state
from justifying its modification by appealing to the overall welfare
of the community. In fact, it would facilitate a rigorous demonstra-
tion of that defense in those cases where it can be mounted. But
71 See Kaiser Aetna, 444 US at 179-80.
72 See Republic Aviation Corp. v NLRB, 324 US 793, 802-05 (1945); Beth Israel Hospi-
tal v NLRB, 437 US 483, 491-93 (1978). There are, of course, complications in this area,
given that outside organizers may well be regarded as trespassers, even though present em-
ployees whom the employer wants to exclude are not. See NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 US 105, 112 (1956); Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 112 S Ct 841 (1992). But now the judicial
vice is to mangle the common law of trespass, instead of just disregarding it. The traditional
view was clear that entry was limited to the time of its allowance, and to the purposes for
which it was granted. See The Six Carpenters' Case, 77 Eng Rep 695, 8 Co Rep 146 (1610).
71 See, for example, Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272, 280 (1928) (state act providing for
the destruction of red cedar trees located within two miles of apple trees found to be consti-
tutional, even though no compensation was given for value of standing trees or decrease in
value of realty).
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the converse-exclusion from constitutional scrutiny of most modi-
fications of liability rules-can lead to the radical destabilization of
the system of property rights, with (as I shall show later) long-term
adverse consequences for the political and social system.
3. Regulation.
Liability rules are only one way in which the government, par-
ticularly the activist government, has altered the distribution of
property holdings among the citizenry. The government has
achieved the same result by imposing various schemes of regula-
tion, such as those which were sanctioned in the early rent control
and zoning cases. And the property-owner must overcome a very
heavy set of burdens to obtain compensation from the state. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has positively gloried in its inability to
articulate clear rules to govern this area: the Court has pretended
to decide each alleged regulatory taking on an ad hoc basis. 4 In
fact, however, the Court has adopted a rule that is predictable, but
incorrect: a virtually conclusive presumption against requiring
compensation for any regulation.
In contrast, regulation is an abridgment of speech under the
First Amendment in a way that it is most definitely not a taking
(even a partial taking) of property under the Fifth Amendment.
Where regulations of speech are imposed, the Supreme Court has
an elaborate classification system designed to cull out unacceptable
forms of regulation. There are divisions into high and low value
speech, and into content-based and content-neutral regulations,
each with its own pattern of justification.75 But there is not the
slightest suggestion anywhere in the entire body of First Amend-
ment law that "mere" regulation of speech is outside the scope of
the First Amendment. The clear perception is that the unre-
strained state can stifle speech and dissent through regulation just
as easily as through a direct ban. Bond or permit requirements for
speakers are always closely scrutinized to see if they conceal an
illegitimate effort to restrict the scope of speech generally. 76 Spe-
cial scrutiny is imposed where there is the slightest hint that the
restrictions are linked to the speaker's viewpoint, however distaste-
71 See, for example, Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 438 US 104,
124 (1978).
7' See text accompanying note 29.
76 See, for example, Cox v New Hampshire, 312 US 569 (1941) (conviction upheld in
parade statute prosecution only because state court had held that local licensing officials
could only consider time, place, and manner restrictions).
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ful that viewpoint may be to the public at large.77 The fear of
abuse of this regulatory power is the most salient explanation for
this aspect of First Amendment law.
Analytically, there is no ground for the distinction between
regulatory takings and infringements of free speech. The state has
taken the fee simple, even if it returns some portion of the land by
way of compensation. Likewise, it has taken the fee simple if it
confiscates it, but then returns it subject to new restrictions on use
and disposition. Restrictive covenants are property interests when
created by consent, and they remain so imposed by the state. What
one side-the covenantee-obtains, the other side-the covenan-
tor-loses. To treat these regulations as "mere" restrictions that
fall outside the scope of the Takings Clause is to immunize vast
areas of government behavior from judicial scrutiny in a manner
that would be incomprehensible under the First Amendment.
4. Taxation.
The last mode of government attack on private behavior is
through a system of taxation. While the formal possibility of
mounting a successful takings challenge against taxation is not ex-
plicitly denied by the Court, it is well-nigh impossible to find any
challenge that has succeeded, even before 1937.78 As for regula-
tions, the courts have adopted a virtually conclusive presumption
against requiring compensation for any tax.
Long ago, Justice Marshall's famous aphorism warned that the
power to tax was the power to destroy. 9 As government taxes con-
tinued to rise even before the end of the Lochner period, Justice
Holmes, who had so much to do with the expansion of the govern-
ment power to tax, was led to say, in essence, "so what?"80 Judges
continue to solemnly maintain that egregious taxes will fall under
the Takings Clause, but if the Supreme Court has invalidated a tax
on takings grounds in the past seventy-five years, I am not aware
" See, for example, Thomas v Collins, 323 US 516, 540 (1944) (invalidating Texas stat-
ute that required union organizers to obtain permit).
71 For a typical statement, see Magnano Co. v Hamilton, 292 US 40, 44 (1934) (Th[e
Takings] Clause is applicable to a taxing statute such as the one here assailed only if the act
be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing
power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbid-
den power, as, for example, the confiscation of property.").
" See McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316, 431 (1819).
80 See Alaska Fish Co. v Smith, 255 US 44, 48 (1921) ("Even if the tax should destroy a
business it would not be made invalid or require compensation upon that ground alone.
Those who enter upon a business take that risk.").
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of it. The basic principle is evidently that the mere benefit of living
in a civilized society is sufficient justification for the imposition of
any tax, however indefensible its incidence or form."' The dangers'
that unsound systems of taxation can work to the operation of the
economic system are not factored into the constitutional equation.
But to deny that taxes are takings-when they involve the threat
of seizure for those who do not voluntarily hand over property-is
to use a definitional ploy to answer a question that calls for a pol-
icy response: Which forms of taxation are permissible in a demo-
cratic society, which are out of bounds, and why?
The attitude toward taxation under the First Amendment is
quite different. It is recognized that taxation is yet another form of
government control, which, if placed in the wrong hands or di-
rected to the wrong means, can distort the political system. It is
clear that the protection of various forms of speech against taxa-
tion does not absolutely prohibit taxation: newspapers can be
taxed on their business profits like other organizations. But it has
led to scrutiny of the permissible justifications for taxation, and of
the permissible forms of taxation."2
In sum, within the law of takings, the broad class of partial
takings-changes in liability rules, regulations, taxation-are all
thought to trigger at most a cursory review, if they are regarded as
takings at all.8 3 The evasiveness of the mode of analysis is always
calculated to impress upon us the need for judicial deference and
legislative discretion, and thereby the justification to expand the
use of government force. With the regulation of property, the pat-
tern of judicial deference stems from the want of any deep convic-
tion that limitations on government power are beneficial, and from
the consequent unwillingness to formulate any principles that have
bite.84
8 See Carmichael v Southern Coal Co., 301 US 495, 522 (1937) ("The only benefit to
which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the
privileges of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded by the devotion of
taxes to public purposes.").
82 See Section III.E.2.
83 See, for example, Penn Central, in which Justice Brennan found that New York
City's landmark preservation law was not a "taking" of the plaintiff's property. 438 US at
136-38. But Justice Brennan left open the possibility that, if the designation system were a
taking, then government would have adequately compensated the plaintiff by awarding it
transferable development rights ("TDRs"), even though the TDRs were worth only a tiny
fraction of the value of the air rights of which the government had deprived the plaintiff. Id
at 137. Yet under the later holding in Kaiser Aetna, 444 US at 180, the case would have
been a taking if the government had sought to build on the plaintiff's property itself, in-
stead of taking what is in essence a restrictive covenant on height.
8 See, for example, Justice Brennan's statement in Penn Central:
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There is no similar relaxed or deferential attitude within the
law of speech. Commentators who care about the principle always
warn that "[a] system of freedom of expression can be successful
only when it rests upon the strongest possible commitment to the
positive right and the narrowest possible basis for exceptions. And
any such exceptions must be clear-cut, precise, and readily con-
trolled." ' 5 All attacks on private speech are regarded as potentially
deadly threats to the operation of the marketplace of ideas, or to
full and active participation in the political process. The Court
never takes the view so common in property cases that the "wis-
dom" of the legislation bears no relationship to its
constitutionality.
C. Question Three: Justifications for Government Restrictions on
Speech and Property
It is clear to limited government libertarians that liberty
should not be regarded as equivalent to anarchy, either as a matter
of first principle or as a matter of constitutional interpretation.
The idea of anarchy is that any person is allowed td speak, or do
anything that he chooses, and that the sole restraint upon that
conduct is private force. Within a legal system, however, the con-
cept of liberty always means what Cardozo once termed "ordered
liberty"S6S-restraints on the freedom of action that take into ac-
count the correlative duties that individual actors owe to others.
That these duties exist is perfectly apparent in the world of indi-
vidual actions: the right to own property and to use it as one
pleases is not an authorization to kill the first person with whom
one has a minor disagreement.
I believe that the system of libertarian justifications is tracea-
ble to a powerful set of utilitarian roots."7 Restrictions on the indi-
vidual's capacity to act are based on the view that all persons are
better off by sacrificing their natural liberty of action than by exer-
While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee . . . [is]
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," Armstrong
v United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), this Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
438 US at 123-24. It is easy to fail if you do not try.
" Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression at 10 (cited in note 24).
"' Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 325 (1937).
8 I have developed this idea in Epstein, 12 Harv J L & Pub Pol 713 (cited in note 34).
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cising it in a world where others use their natural powers against
them. The prohibition against the threat of force thus arises from
the mutual renunciation of the private use of force, obtained not
through voluntary agreement, but by government edict, needed to
overcome the holdout and bargaining problems that otherwise
would exist. However, for these purposes it is not important to de-
tail the exact derivation of these utilitarian claims, for the restric-
tions on the use of property and freedom of action are accepted by
virtually every one, including those who conceive of a far broader
set of public justifications for the restriction of property and/or
speech.
What is equally clear under libertarian theory is that there is
no artificial divide between speech and property when the question
is whether there is any justification for limiting individual actions.
Freedom of speech implies the same limitations associated with
freedom of action, or with freedom of contract. The same concerns
with force and fraud that arise under the general libertarian theory
surface with great force in efforts to discover the appropriate limits
of both speech and property rights. For instance, the threat of
force will often involve the use of speech, and if not speech, then
surely those forms of expression (for example, gestures or signs)
that fall comfortably within the narrowest definitions of expression
championed under modern theory. The mere fact that the threat
and the use of force are equated under the general theory shows
that both speech and conduct are subject to the same sort of scru-
tiny, and for much the same reason: to improve the overall opera-
tion of the social system.
1. Justifications for restricting free speech.
a) Preventing private force. Many First Amendment
cases deal with the government's power to punish conduct that in-
volves the threat or use of force. The entire line of sedition cases,
from the outset of the First World War until the 1950s, were
largely devoted to a single question: When, and how, could the
government impose restrictions upon speech that posed the risk of
physical danger or disruption of public services?88 Holmes put the
issue squarely in Schenck when, in conjunction with his reference
to shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater, he noted that "[the most
stringent protection of free speech] does not protect a man from an
"8 For a collection of the relevant cases and materials, see Stone, et al, Constitutional
Lau- at 1025-1100 (cited in note 7).
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injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of
force."89 A similar view was taken where "fighting words"
threatened riot or mayhem."
During the formative period of modern First Amendment ju-
risprudence, the police power of the state was confined to police
work. No matter how much we have come to disapprove of
Schenck, and to admire Abrams v United States,91 the exceptions
to the basic protection of speech were always associated with the
preservation of the public order against the risk of treason or vio-
lence. The significant debates over the scope and limitation of the
"clear and present danger" test were all about the narrow class of
ends that government could permissibly suppress. If the speech in
question threatened conduct that was not a common law offense
against person, property, or national security, then its suppression
was inconsistent with freedom of speech. There was no discussion
about the irrelevance of the common law, or the search for novel
baselines congenial to the New Deal era. There was an extensive
debate over how far back to roll the carpet in order to protect
against the overthrow of the government, an issue on which strong
disagreement is possible.92
The current constitutional equilibrium on subversive speech,
reached in Brandenburg v Ohio,93 is consistent with the general
libertarian approach:
[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
Schenck, 249 US 47, 52. See also note 28 (discussing Kalven's views).
See, for example, Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942), in which the
Court noted the "fighting words" exception to the First Amendment, and narrowly con-
strued it to cover only those words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id at 572. See also Feiner v New York, 340 US
315 (1951), in which the Court similarly limited "fighting words" to those which posed an
"immediate threat to public safety, peace or order," and sustained a conviction on those
grounds alone. Id at 320, citing Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 308 (1940).
9' 250 US 616 (1919) (knowledge of probable consequences of distributing circulars suf-
ficient to sustain conviction under Espionage Act of 1918).
92 See Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1925) (requires "language of direct incitement"
"used with intent and purpose"); Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927) (stressing defer-
ence to the legislature, upheld conviction for membership in an organization advocating
criminal syndicalism); Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951) ("whether the gravity of
the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is neces-
sary to avoid the danger"); Yates v United States, 354 US 298 (1957) ("those to whom the
advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than
merely to believe in something").
3 395 US 444 (1969).
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directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action. As we said in Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961), "the mere ab-
stract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral neces-
sity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as pre-
paring a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action."94
By the same token, it goes without saying that offensiveness does
not limit the scope of First Amendment protection. The flag-burn-
ing case is the most salient illustration of political speech, designed
to offend, but which nonetheless cannot be regulated because it
does not pose an imminent threat of violence9 5
The reasons for judicial protection are instructive on the
theme of distrust. It is not that the harms caused by flag-burning
and similar activities are not real, for they are, or that they are not
substantial, for that they may be as well.9 Instead, it is that the
risks of collective reprisal are rightly regarded as so great that the
government is required to stay its hand. The class of external
harms that justify the police power are sharply, even artificially,
limited in order to limit the scope of government action. The par-
allel here is to the common law conception of damnum absque in-
juria ("harm without legal injury"), which is imposed not because
other persons have suffered no harm, but because the freedom of
action and the social gains which that freedom brings are only pos-
sible when certain forms of harm (for example, offense, competi-
tive loss) are not recognized by the legal system.9
The question of external harms does not arise, however, only
in subversive advocacy cases, but in other less dramatic contexts as
well. Public speech can often be noisy and offensive, and it is clear
that the Court tolerates "time, place, and manner" restrictions on
speech.98 Two features about these regulations should be quickly
noted. First, they are directed against conduct that the common
91 Id at 447-48. Note that one could quarrel with this decision on the ground that it is
too protective of speech. There may be some harms so serious in their implications that the
imminence requirement should be relaxed. But for these purposes, the rule falls squarely
within the libertarian tradition, and tallies closely with Chaplinsky.
95 See Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397 (1989).
11 "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable." Johnson, 491 US at 414.
11 This point was first developed in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and
Intent, 8 Harv L Rev 1, 2-10 (1894).
Is See Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 1257-1337 (cited in note 7).
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law ordinarily treats as nuisance, such as the use of loudspeakers
or sound trucks in public places.99 Second, the problem of selective
enforcement looms large even when the regulations are content-
neutral, and is taken into account when the courts review the en-
forcement of these "time, place, and manner" restrictions. These
restrictions on speech thus require principled justification as well.
b) .Preventing private fraud. Other speech restrictions
are justified on the grounds that they prevent private fraud or mis-
representation. The libertarian rationale for the tort of defamation
is that it constitutes the wrong of misrepresentation, directed not
to the victim of the wrong, but to some third party. The New York
Times line of cases shows how even misrepresentation cases are
greeted with hostility, in large measure because of the suspicion of
the abuse of government power. 0 And the same attitude of cau-
tion is shown toward state efforts to regulate the conduct, for ex-
ample, of union organizers, even under circumstances where there
is persuasive evidence of private fraud.' 0 '
Even the commercial speech cases have shown some signs of
falling into the same pattern. In principle, these cases show the
impossibility of maintaining the strong line between action and ex-
pression that drives Emerson's analysis of the First Amendment. A
price system is best understood as a system of communication that
impounds relevant information. Thus a system of price controls is
best understood as an interference with the way in which the price
system transfers that information. 102 Direct attacks on price con-
trols based on takings, or allied grounds have had only rare suc-
cess.10 3 But while the price mechanism has not been brought under
the First Amendment, ordinary forms of advertisement have been,
and here the libertarian potential of the First Amendment some-
times surfaces.
See, for example, Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77 (1949).
100 For an overview of the New York Times line of cases, see Stone, et al, Constitu-
tional Law at 1145-71 (cited in note 7).
101 See Thomas v Collins, 323 US 516 (1945) (statute requiring labor organizers to ob-
tain a permit soliciting workers to join unions invalid under the First Amendment).
102 For an elaboration of the point, see Daniel Shapiro, Free Speech, Free Exchange,
and Rawlsian Liberalism, 17 Social Theory and Practice 47, 50-57 (1991).
,"I For one recent victory, see Calfarm Insurance Co. v Deukmejian, 258 Cal Rptr 161,
771 P2d 1247, 1252-56 (1989) (granting relief against automatic 20% rollback in insurance
proposal). For one recent failure, see State Farm v State of New Jersey, 124 NJ 31, 590 A2d
191 (1991) (rejecting challenge to New Jersey's insurance reform legislation).
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Take a case in point. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,04 the Court struck down
state restrictions that barred pharmacies from advertising the
price at which they sold their goods. The fanciful justifications
that were offered for such regulation all had an economic cast: that
advertisement would lead to a loss of the professional image among
pharmacists; that able firms would be driven out of business be-
cause of their inability to compete on price, leaving a clear field to
the predators to drive up the price thereafter.10 5 Had this been a
challenge based on the Due Process Clause, the Court indicated
that these rationales, however specious, could have justified the
statute."6 But within the framework of the First Amendment, the
Court immediately reverted to the libertarian analysis, and noted
that the seller of a high-quality product could advertise quality in
opposition to price. 10 7 It has been said that this decision resur-
rected substantive due process,10 8 and so it did, but that should be
regarded as one of its strongest features, not as one of its
drawbacks.
2. Justifications for restrictions on property rights.
In most cases involving property or economic liberties, how-
ever, the police power, now used as a term of art, has grown so that
it bears no relationship to the control of either force or fraud. Few
cases of land use regulation, for example, are concerned with the
control and use of force in any form. The nearest kin to trespas-
sory force is nuisance; yet the nuisance control rationale for the
police power in land use cases has been repeatedly rejected as an
authoritative basis for deciding these cases. 0 9 Often the nuisance
control rationale is rejected on conceptual grounds: that it is im-
possible to tell who has caused a nuisance and who has been a vic-
tim. 10 This is ironic, because the nuisance control rationale is an
04 425 US 748 (1976).
105 Id at 764-70.
106 Id at 769.
"'7 Id at 769-70. The Court did, of course, permit regulation against advertisements
that were "false or misleading in any way." Id at 771.
108 See Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Eco-
nomic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va L Rev 1, 29-33 (1979).
109 The process started in the 1920s with Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 387-
88 (1926), and Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272, 280 (1928), and continues today.
10 The view has also been defended in Michelman, 80 Harv L Rev at 1196-1201 (cited
in note 6); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L J 36, 48-50 (1964);
Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L J 149, 161-69
(1971). I have criticized the view in Takings at 115-21 (cited in note 2).
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important distinguishing principle for content-neutral cases under
the First Amendment. On the one hand, content-neutral regulation
designed to limit the use of sound trucks is routinely upheld.11' On
the other hand, legislative characterizations of certain other con-
duct as "nuisances"-such as the distribution of handbills-are ac-
corded virtually no weight at all.'12
The difference in approach yields powerful differences in con-
sequences. Once all specific content has drained out of the police
power language, any legitimate public function of conceivable
merit justifies government restriction on land use. The narrow ac-
count of external harms accepted under the First Amendment no
longer limits what the state may do under the Fifth Amendment.
Aesthetics, popular sentiments, and environmental objectives all
become appropriate pegs on which to hang legal justifications for
land use restrictions.'" No explanation is given as to why the nar-
row account of external harms under the First Amendment is so
inappropriate here. As the ends have widened, so too the means to
achieve those ends have been broadly construed, and all the bur-
dens of proof are set in favor of the state, so that any challenge of
land use restrictions is always an uphill battle.
Notwithstanding the many differences in the reach of the po-
lice power in speech and property cases, there does exist some con-
vergence between them, namely under the shadowy protection of
the public "morals" facet of the police power. Here the great
problems arise in mixed cases, such as those involving billboards" 4
or "adult" movie theaters," 5 where the level of regulation tolerated
by the courts is normally higher than that associated with speech
alone. In part, the rationale for these decisions is that the regula-
tions deal not only with speech, but also with land use, where the
standards of review are clearly much lower. The outcomes are in
part defensible, especially if one could demonstrate that certain
private activities increase the risk of neighborhood violence and
disorganization. In some cases, such as the recent nude dancing de-
cision,"' problems of land use and free speech converge. The prin-
"' See note 99 and accompanying text.
112 See, for example, Lovel, 303 US 444, 451 (voiding city ordinance which put prior
restraint upon distribution of handbills and similar literature as "nuisances").
"' See, for example, Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 32-33 (1954) (holding that.protection
of "spiritual" and "aesthetic" values was a legitimate exercise of municipality's police
power).
114 See Metromedia, Inc. v San Diego, 453 US 490 (1981).
"' See Young v American Mini Theatres, 427 US 50 (1976).
116 Barnes v Glen Theatre, 111 S Ct 2456 (1991).
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ciples of individual freedom collide with the "morals" facet of the
pdlice power, which sometimes operates as a supplement to, and at
other times as an extension of, the state's power to prohibit various
forms of violence and fraud.
These difficult cases lie at the edge of the law under any com-
prehensive theory, and for my purposes, at least, the location of
the proper line is not the dominant concern. The so-called
''morals" cases represent the easiest extension of the police power
in a land use setting, and the most difficult extension of the police
power in a First Amendment setting. It is the radically different
responses to the easy cases that marks the difference under the
two amendments. A more unified approach to the questions of
speech and property would aid in the design of a more satisfactory
legal response.
D. Question Four: The Choice of Remedies
The differences in judicial treatment of speech and property
are also revealed in the selection of remedies against individual ac-
tors that have committed some wrong. In principle, there is a wide
range of remedies available for any wrong. Some of these remedies
are imposed through direct government action, as when the crimi-
nal law provides for imprisonment and fines. In addition, there is a
full range of administrative and regulatory remedies designed to
eliminate the harm before it begins. Injunctions can be issued
against threatened harms, and most importantly a system of per-
mits and licenses can be imposed in order to prevent these harms
in the first place. Similarly, on the private side, individual plain-
tiffs may seek orders for damages, orders for restitution, or injunc-
tions. In those cases where there is only a single isolated harm, the
choice of remedy is relatively constrained: damages matter, injunc-
tions do not. But with institutional defendants capable of repeat
offenses, systems of social control and systems of prior restraints
are feasible, and, in some circumstances-for example, driver's li-
censes-desirable as well.
1. Prior restraints on speech.
As with other parts of the overall system, the choice of reme-
dies is driven in large measure by the fear of government abuse,
relative to private abuse. In the First Amendment area, there is a
virtual per se rule against any prior restraint of publication, no
matter how harmful or defamatory the material might be. Histori-
cally, a fear of prior restraint was the first great motivating force of
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the free speech tradition, dating back to Milton and Blackstone."'
In its modern form, once a restriction is identified as a prior re-
straint, any individual citizen is free to act in defiance of that re-
striction without exhausting any available administrative reme-
dies."' There is no possibility that the state can postpone
publication of controversial speech by making grudging adminis-
trative concessions after intolerable procedural delays.
There have been a wide variety of concerns with the licensing
power, all of which work back to the common theme of distrust. It
is said that licensing concentrates too much power in the hands of
a small group of individuals, not only when it provides for adminis-
trative remedies, but even when it provides for judicial review of
individual cases. 119 It is said that the want of clear standards only
increases the risk of the improper use of discretion by political ac-
tors.120 It is said that prior restraint keeps relevant information off
the market; thus it denies the audience the right to read and com-
fient on that information itself, and it denies the author the right
to publish the material so long as he or she is prepared to pay the
price. 2' It is said that the procedural protections from administra-
tive hearings are likely to be lower than' those of judicial proceed-
ings, especially in a criminal context.'22 It is all true.
The upshot is that any form of prior restraint is struck down,
even when there is an arguable ground for issuing an injunction
under ordinary common law principles, as was the circumstance in
the Pentagon Papers case.' 2 ' Prior restraints of all forms and de-
"1 John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the
Parliament of England, in George H. Sabine, ed, Areopagitica and Of Education (Harlan
Davidson, 1951); William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *151 ("The liberty of the press is
indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no previous re-
straints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished.") (emphasis in original).
Il See Lovell, 303 US at 452-53 ("As the ordinance is void on its face, it was not neces-
sary for appellant to seek a permit under it. She was entitled to contest its validity in an-
swer to the charge against her.").
119 Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697, 715 (1931) (Minnesota statute authorizing state to
seek injunctions against routine publishers of malicious or defamatory information on the
grounds of nuisance found unconstitutional).
120 City of Lakewood v Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 US 750, 769-70 (1988) (ordi-
nance granting mayor absolute discretion in granting of applications for annual permits to
place newsracks on public property found unconstitutional).
"' See Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L & Contemp Probs
648, 656-60 (1955).
122 Id at 657. See also Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Cntral
Linkage, 66 Minn L Rev 11, 43-47 (1981).
23 New York Times Co. v United States, 403 US 713 (1971) (lifting temporary injunc-
tion against publication of information leaked to papers by Daniel Ellsworth). Among the
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scriptions are routinely disallowed, save under the most extraordi-
nary circumstances-such as where I can show you how to make a
nuclear bomb cheaply. Other criminal and civil sanctions are
required.
2. Prior restraints on property use.
The situation is radically different under the Takings Clause,
where today it is virtually impossible for any private party to
maintain a facial challenge against any form of land use regulation.
Instead, the dominant rule requires that all administrative reme-
dies first be exhausted, and that constitutional challenges be
brought on an "as applied" basis.1 4 The risk of government misbe-
havior due to local or national politics is as large here as it is with
speech restrictions: there are dangers of excessive local power and
bias; there are costs to outsiders (the potential buyers of the devel-
oped property) which are ignored in setting the social calculus;
there is far less protection than in any judicial proceeding. There is
no reason to believe that public officials who improperly thwart the
distribution of leaflets will become impartial solons on economic
matters. No one has that kind of a split brain, with virtue in the
property hemisphere, and vice in the speech hemisphere.
Yet there is scant recognition of the evils that are endemic in
this area and the social dislocations that can follow. The Supreme
Court is quite content to require individual property-holders to file
endless requests for variances with hostile zoning boards before
considering a case at all. 2 5 None of the concerns with permits that
dominate the First Amendment area carry over to the Takings
Clause. Instead the Supreme Court has written: "[A]fter all, the
very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be
reasons offered for the decision was that Congress had only authorized criminal sanctions
against the individuals who improperly obtained or retained forbidden information, so that
the decision dealt as much with separation of powers as with freedom of speech. See id at
740-48 (Marshall concurring). But at common law, a private party could normally obtain
relief against a third person who acquired property with knowledge that it was not owned by
the immediate seller. In principle, the analogous rule could apply to sales of information.
The injunction could then be applied against persons who received stolen information in
bad faith, that is, with knowledge that it had been obtained illegally.
124 Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 US 264, 297 & n
40 (1981).
'25 Williamson Planning Comm'n v Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 186-88 (1985) (plain-
tiff seeking zoning approval had to exhaust all available administrative remedies, including
petitioning the administrative agency for variances).
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granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as de-
sired." ' Oh?
This steadfast refusal to provide early and prompt remedies in
takings cases is intimately tied to the basic propositions of takings
law. The Supreme Court has noted that its own fuzzy standards of
what constitutes a taking make it impossible to decide whether the
government has misbehaved, and to decide what compensation, if
any, to require before a matter has been brought to a close.12 7 The
upshot is that local governments are utterly free to ignore the in-
terests of those whom they regulate, so long as they are willing to
throw elaborate hurdles in the paths of those who would challenge
their regulations. The risk of local bias and the social losses that
follow from the partial or permanent development of property may
well be great, but there is no way to force the issue to adjudication.
Instead of the present rules that tolerate abusive behavior and
foster costly delays, the system should be redone from the ground
up. The permit system should be scrapped. Neighbors and local
governments should be able to sue to enjoin the completion or op-
eration of local land uses only by showing that there is some immi-
nent (I would settle for serious) danger of external harms. Where
the future harm is uncertain, and the project goes forward, then
the landowner might be required to post bond to make good the
losses that its conduct might impose on strangers.
The stakes on prior restraint may not be as high for property
as they are for speech, although it is hard to be dogmatic on the
point without knowledge of particular circumstances. But the rele-
vant concern is not whether a prior restraint rule causes more mis-
chief with speech than it does with property. Instead the concern is
to apply sound rules in both areas. Toward that end, the rules de-
veloped in conjunction with the First Amendment should be used
to reform the impoverished law of takings. The present attitude,
which allows full administrative discretion without any judicial ac-
countability, is one of the worst blemishes of the current system.
E. Question Five: Forced Exchanges
There is one last way to test the limitations of state power
under the First and Fifth Amendments. To what extent does the
state have the power to single out or select the target of its regula-
' United States v Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US 121, 127 (1985). Lower
courts have relied on Riverside Bayview to stifle challenges to rent control legislation. See,
for example, Gilbert v City of Cambridge, 932 F2d 51, 56 (1st Cir 1991).
2I Williamson, 473 US at 199-200.
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tions? The general argument here is that the power to select cer-
tain practices or individuals for special government sanctions is an
enormous government power that can easily fall prey to abuse. One
application of this principle is that regulations do not on their face
impose disproportionate burdens on similar activities. A rule that
permits the state to impose sanctions on some but not on others,
or even one that permits the state to impose heavier sanctions on
one than on the other, is a peril against which every legal system
should guard.
1. Selection bias.
a) Free speech. The importance of this selection bias is
evident under the First Amendment, where the modern law im-
poses very heavy burdens on the state to use content-neutral in-
stead of content-based regulations. Even if the content-neutral reg-
ulations are broader in their coverage than content-based
regulations, the necessity of imposing burdens on friend and foe
alike operates as an implicit but effective check against the abuse
of government power. Thus a rule that prohibits all billboard ad-
vertisements is less dangerous than one that allows billboards for
all purposes, save political campaigns, which in turn is far less dan-
gerous than one that permits billboards to be used only by major
political parties, or even by Democrats and not Republicans, or the
reverse.
The key is that the total level of speech 'permitted is of less
importance than the mix of speech allowed. 2 " We would rather
have a system in which both sides (of a two-sided issue) could
speak with two units each than a system in which one side could
speak with ten units of speech and the other none. The constitu-
tional theme becomes distortion and imbalance, and content-based
distinctions that go to the merits of the ideas expressed are prime
examples of the problem.
b) Takings. The same question of political abuse and
discretion can arise in connection with the regulation of property
and economic liberties. As before, the power to select certain busi-
nesses or firms for regulation is easily abused by the political sys-
tem. A rule that would subject margarine to heavier taxes than
butter is one that gives a competitive advantage to the latter over
... See Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 197-200 (cited in note 29).
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the former.1"9 A rule that bans plastic milk containers while al-
lowing paper ones is subject to the same criticism.1 0 A law that
allows a zoning board selectively to designate certain parcels of
land as large-lot residential land and then to designate neighboring
plots of land as commercial land carries with it the same risk.13' In
takings cases, there is some language suggesting that dispropor-
tionate impact will require the state to provide compensation for
the property that it has taken.'32 But the case law has easily
evaded its lofty rhetorical standard, and has sanctioned facially
non-neutral government regulations that are ripe for abuse.
2. Taxation.
The difference in how speech and takings law treat selection
bias can be most conveniently seen if we pay attention to one par-
ticular form of government action-taxation. The taxation of
newspapers, for example, could present a clear collision between
the claims of free speech and the claims of government. Within a
strongly libertarian world, the initial impulse is to say that institu-
tions remain free only if they are not subject to tax at all. The
usual libertarian formulation is that obligations are imposed upon
parties to prevent the use of force, the commission of fraud, or the
breach of promise. Taxation is premised on none of these ratio-
nales, and should therefore be illegal.
The point is not without historical precedent, for the rhetoric
of free trade has on occasion been used by judges to excuse inter-
state commerce from all sorts of state taxation. 33 Over time, how-
ever, this "libertarian" position has been repudiated in favor of the
view that state taxation of interstate commerce cannot be imposed
on a discriminatory basis,13 but can be imposed on a nondiscrimi-
129 See McCray v United States, 195 US 27 (1904) (affirming the legislature's preroga-
tive to tax margarine, but not butter).
... Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 US 456 (1981) (affirming state's right to
distinguish between containers for environmental purposes).
131 See Penn Central, 438 US 104 (landmark designation). See also note 83.
See, for example, Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40, 49 (1960) (The Takings
Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
,33 Freeman v Hewit, 329 US 249, 252 (1946) ("state is also precluded from taking any
action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade
between states"); Spector Motor Service v O'Connor, 340 US 602, 610 (1951) (federal privi-
lege of carrying on interstate commerce free from state taxation).
134 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274, 287-89 (1977). For an ex-
haustive historical account of the subject, see Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Inter-
state Business: Perspectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 Tax
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natory basis. This same approach is surely correct for speech and
takings law as well.
Thus First Amendment doctrine should take its cue, as indeed
it has, from the cases regulating state taxation of interstate com-
merce. The basic principle is that the tax system works on a bene-
fit theory of taxation, whereby the burdens associated with run-
ning a complex society are distributed pro rata to those
institutions that benefit from its operations. The ability to pay the
tax is irrelevant to the analysis. Protected by an antidiscrimination
rule that covers all businesses, a newspaper that is subject to a tax
has scant reason to complain, because the services provided from
the taxes collected are equal or greater in value to the money sur-
rendered to pay for them. Any nondiscriminatory system of taxa-
tion-of which flat taxes are the best candidate-should yield a
net benefit to the newspaper taxed. Although the First Amend-
ment has no explicit "just compensation" language that allows for
forced exchanges beneficial to the taxed party, but imposed by the
state, the eminent domain approach carries over to this situation,
even if not formally acknowledged as such, in the cases.
The situation becomes more clouded when taxation is allowed
to serve redistributive as well as protective ends, as in the welfare
state. Then newspapers, along with all other taxed entities, could
be systematically hurt by the tax, which then could be attacked on
the ground that the costs imposed are an impediment to speech.
This argument has been rejected, apparently without a struggle, on
the ground that newspapers are not singled out for special treat-
ment, and therefore obtain protection by anonymity: The resis-
tance that others display to increased taxes protects newspapers
against special oppression by the state, and hence against abuse.
While it is quite likely that governments are willing to tax the
press out of business, it is unlikely that they will set taxes to drive
all businesses into bankruptcy. The protection afforded by the
nondiscrimination rule may deviate from what is required by theo-
ries of optimal taxation, but it does afford important protection
against invidious taxation by the state.
The litigated cases of taxation under the First Amendment are
not concerned with the question of differential taxation rates be-
tween the press and other institutions. Instead they address the
question of differential taxation among members of the press.
What is instructive about this line of cases is that it develops a
Lawyer 37 (1987). For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State ch 9
(Princeton, forthcoming 1993).
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powerful argument for the use of flat taxation across firms, which
has powerful application to the general question of taxation under
the eminent domain power. In Grosjean v American Press Co.13
the Supreme Court struck down a license tax, equal to two percent
of gross receipts, that was levied only against publications in the
state whose weekly circulation was in excess of 20,000.136 At one
level, the case was easy, for there was ample information in the
record that the tax assumed this form because Senator Huey Long
and his state henchmen wished to attack the major papers in the
state that had criticized him. But the tax was also suspect on
structural grounds, because it singled out some papers for special
treatment. The Court relied on both rationales to strike down the
tax, avoiding the question of whether the facial discrimination
within the class was sufficient to condemn the class.'37
The structural issue was fairly raised in Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,"8 where the
use tax in question was imposed on the print and ink used by all
newspapers, with a $100,000 exemption per paper.139 The Minne-
apolis Star attacked the tax for its discriminatory impact, noting
that it bore the disproportionate brunt of the tax: only eleven out
of 388 papers in the state paid any tax at all, and among that
eleven, over two-thirds of the total tax ($608,634 out of $893,355)
was paid by the Star alone.140 The case raised none of the motive
issues that clouded the legal question in Grosjean,'4' and the
Court struck down the tax.
The Court noted first that general economic regulations appli-
cable to other business-for example, the antitrust laws or the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act-could unquestionably be applied to
the press.'42 But the Court then noted that the special use tax on
print and ink, with its special exemption, was nowhere duplicated
in the Minnesota tax code. 43 The tax was a form of "special taxa-
tion" that "[could not] stand unless the burden [was] necessary to
achieve an overriding governmental interest.' 14 4 Thus the tax
"' 297 US 233 (1936).
136 Id at 240.
... Id at 250-51.
3 460 US 575 (1983).
139 Id at 578.
140 Id.
"I Id at 580.
12 Id.
"' Id at 582.
14 Id.
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failed for two reasons: First, there was no reason to separate the
press from the general system of taxation. Second, within the class
of newspapers, there was no reason to impose a differential burden
on the Star. The Court recognized that it was difficult to trace the
economic consequences of any tax, and that, for all it knew, this
tax might benefit newspapers relative to everyone else. But it
found that safety necessitated that this tax conform with the
others, both within the industry and across industries. 14 5
In short, the state had a compelling interest in collecting reve-
nue which justified imposing a tax, but not for imposing a tax of
this form. "If the real goal of this tax is to duplicate the sales tax,
it is difficult to see why the State did not achieve that goal by the
obvious and effective expedient of applying the sales tax." '146 The
Court was quite suspicious of the unequal distribution of the tax
across members of the press. The Court's language is worth quot-
ing in full:
Whatever the motive of the legislature in this case, we think
that recognizing a power in the State not only to single out
the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few
members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that
no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme. It
has asserted no interest other than its desire to have an "equi-
table" tax system. The current system, it explains, promotes
equity because it places the burden on large publications that
impose more social costs than do smaller publications and
that are more likely to be able to bear the burden of the tax.
Even if we were willing to accept the premise that large busi-
nesses are more profitable and therefore better able to bear
the burden of the tax, the State's commitment to this "eq-
uity" is questionable, for the concern has not led the State to
grant benefits to small businesses in general. And when the
exemption selects such a narrowly defined group to bear the
full burden of the tax, the tax begins to resemble more a pen-
alty for a few of the largest newspapers than an attempt to
favor struggling smaller enterprises147
The point can be made more simply. Whatever revenue target
the state wishes to achieve under its sales tax can be achieved by a
flat tax across all firms in all industries, without any possibility of
,4' Id at 585.
,4 Id at 587-88.
Id at 591-92 (footnotes omitted).
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political abuse. Arguments in this form, however, apply not only to
enterprises that fall within the scope of the First Amendment, but
across the board. To give only the most notorious example, the
windfall profits tax was sustained by the Supreme Court in the
teeth of an explicit uniformity challenge (Alaskan north-slope oil
was taxed differently), which was given the typically low standard
of review that has been applied to economic matters, regardless of
which clause of the Constitution they arise under. 14 8 But in this
situation, it is difficult to figure out any sensible justification for
the differential tax treatment, given that subsidies distort choices
in economic markets in the same way they do in the market for
speech and ideas. There are no special social costs involved in the
production of oil (that is, those costs which cannot be handled by
direct control of pollution), and ability to pay is irrelevant in the
larger economic context as in the speech case. Similarly, it is be-
side the point to observe that the tax may be passed on to consum-
ers or back to suppliers, for a flat tax surely achieves that result
while sparing the court the impossible economic inquiry of tracing
out the incidence of the tax burden. 49
Point by point, then, the intellectual case against all forms of
special taxation is identical in all its particulars to those developed
by Justice O'Connor in Minneapolis Star. Unless there is some
reason, of which I am unaware, why the modern preoccupations
with baselines and just initial entitlements alter the results, there
seems to be no reason why the arguments in Minneapolis Star
should not be used to strike down the industry-specific special
taxes that litter the present landscape.
Can the argument be carried still one step further? One way to
look at the tax in Minneapolis Star is that it was a system of pro-
gressive taxation, in which most newspapers paid no tax, and the
largest ones paid over four percent for print and ink costs in excess
of $100,000. Surely the outcome in the case would have been iden-
tical if there had been a two percent tax on print and ink
purchases between $100,000 and $250,000. In essence, what the
Court has said is that progressive taxation on different members of
the press is unconstitutional under the First Amendment because
of the differential burdens that it imposes. Why does the same ar-
gument not apply with respect to a progressive tax generally? So
long as the state can meet its budgets generally, then there is no
,48 United States v Ptasynski, 462 US 74 (1983).
,4' For a more extensive development of this point, see Epstein, Takings at 290-92
(cited in note 2).
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reason why it should not adopt that form of tax which is least ca-
pable of abuse, and most amenable to judicial supervision to reach
its goals.
IV. RECONCILING THE WELFARE STATE WITH ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
Now we reach the crux of the difference between private prop-
erty and economic liberties on the one hand, and freedom of
speech on the other. There is, as Minneapolis Star tells us, no case
for income redistribution within the domain of speech, and indeed
strong reasons to oppose it. But the same argument cannot be
made with the same force with regard to income redistribution in
general.
The case against income redistribution must come to grips
with the common perception-the only perception that makes
charitable assistance to the poor intelligible-that a dollar of in-
come is worth more to a poor person than to a rich one. It can only
overcome that perception by showing that the ostensible gains
from redistribution are wholly outweighed by the manifold practi-
cal obstacles to effective redistribution, and by the unfortunate in-
centive effects for the creation of wealth that redistribution cre-
ates. It is very clear, notwithstanding the mythic significance that
some attach to it,150 that Lochner did not stand for the proposition
that all forms of income redistribution and welfare measures were
prohibited, if only because these were routinely upheld by the
Court against all forms of challenges before Lochner was decided
in 1905, and before it was overthrown after 1937.15'
The question thus arises whether the lessons on disproportion-
ate impact and discriminatory taxation applied with such diligence
can be carried over into the welfare state, where by definition some
form of income and wealth redistribution is routinely allowed, not-
withstanding the explicit anti-redistributive language of the Tak-
ings Clause. I think that this reconciliation can take place, and on
grounds that should be able to draw the consent of liberals and
conservatives alike. The outline of the compromise, which I have
tO See, for example, Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev 873 (cited in note 1).
'1 See, for example, Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v Pennsylvania, 134 US 232 (1890). On the
breakdown of the limitations on taxation, see Clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts
(California, 1954). Note that the tax in Pollock v Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 US 429
(1895), was also progressive, but was not struck down on that ground. See also New York
Trust Co. v Eisner, 256 US 345 (1921) (sustaining a progressive estate tax).
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proposed before,'52 is that the state can redistribute as much as it
likes from rich to poor so long as it does so through general reve-
nue taxes. There is of course some room for redistribution even
with the flat tax on income. This proposal waives all objections to
progressive taxation, but insists only that the remainder of the
structure protecting private property and economic liberties be
respected and enforced. If the state wants to provide individuals
with below market housing, then it can rent the units from private
owners at market levels, relet them to poorer citizens at below
market levels, and make up the difference by a tax on general reve-
nues. The program thus places the cost of this public good (as re-
distribution has become) on the public at large, where in fairness
and justice it belongs. The public at large has decided that the
change is appropriate and thus should foot the bill for initiatives
that the landowner may well have opposed. What can be done with
rent control can be done with zoning, with specialized facilities for
the handicapped, with subsidized health insurance for AIDS vic-
tims, and with educational vouchers for the poor. If one can make
a gift transaction to the poor, it is always possible to fund it out of
general revenues.
The justification for this approach has thus far been phrased
in the distributive language used by Justice Black in his well
known quotation from Armstrong.5 But it bears repetition that
the shift in financing procedure has vast implications for both
democratic theory and economic efficiency. As regards the former,
it encourages responsible behavior by citizens, who are no longer in
the position to vote revenues for group A out of the pocket of
group B. The tendency to play special interest politics will be
eased by the requirement that participation entails the right to
control but also entails the obligation to bear imposed obligations
with one's fellow citizens. Even staunch defenders of republican
virtue should prefer a responsible citizenry to the powerful one,
and this reconciliation of the Takings Clause with the welfare state
achieves just that end.
The efficiency argument is every bit as powerful. The nature
of the programs that will be funded will differ as the method for
funding those programs changes. The situation in which the voters
at large can shift all the costs of running the welfare state to a tiny
"52 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Of Maginot Lines and Constitutional Com-
promises, in Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman, eds, Liberty, Property, and the Fu-
ture of Constitutional Development 173 (SUNY, 1990).
.. See note 132.
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fraction of the population contains a built-in externality: one group
decides, and another group pays. The usual economic conclusion
about externalities applies: too much of the good will be demanded
relative to other goods that might be purchased, a conclusion that
applies even when one good is aid to the poor and the other is
repaving the public streets. Correct voting procedure neutralizes
some of the externalities that are otherwise implicit in the current
system that invites disproportionate funding, not only of welfare
payments, but of any imaginable government expenditure
(whether or not pure public goods). A system that more accurately
measures the public sympathy and support for various programs is
surely preferable to one that so skews the inquiry that the level of
production of welfare payments, relative to other goods, is exces-
sive. The total level of goods and services should increase as well,
which increases the size of the base available for redistributive
purchases. Even a post-New Deal legislature, however aware of the
evils of common law baselines, can only redistribute through the
political process what is produced through the economic one.
Finally the proposal places a limitation on the nature and
kinds of redistribution that are feasible: There is redistribution
along one dimension only, from rich to poor, for it is only along
that line that one can assume that a single unit of wealth means
more to the recipient than it does to the donor. Gone are the days
therefore of the inveterate agricultural subsidies that benefit cor-
porate farmers at the expense of poor ghetto dwellers, and gone are
the days when exclusionary zoning can keep poor people out of af-
fluent suburbs. If redistribution of wealth from rich to poor is the
goal, then a court can scrutinize the program in question to see
that there is a reasonable means-end connection. The welfare state
is thus reconcilable with the Bill of Rights in an imperfect but
powerful way. It remains to see whether the inveterate judicial
temperament keeps us chained to a jurisprudence of economic lib-
erty that has stifled the power and initiative of this country for the
last fifty years, indeed longer.
1992]

